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Prologue: Unearthing the Goblet 
 
Carlton Davis is Jamaica’s Cabinet Secretary, the country’s most senior public 
servant. Eleven years ago, on one of his first days on the job, he took a walk 
around his new domain and discovered a room full of papers. There were piles 
and piles of documents. Rooting around, coughing with the dust, he moved one 
particularly large tower only to discover beneath it a silver goblet. Polishing it with 
the sleeve of his jacket, he read to his amazement that it was a special 
commemorative Olympic trophy that had been awarded to the successful 
Jamaican athletics relay team decades before.  It was a national treasure, yet it  
had been literally buried in papers.   What other nuggets of history or critical 
information were lost in the chaos of unorganized and discarded documents?  As 
a scientist by training, he understood the value of learning from the past, and the 
importance of good documentation to make this possible. Greatly concerned by 
what he had found in that room and, looking back now, Davis traces his 
commitment to access to information to that moment. He recognizes the value of 
access to information as a human right, and the role information can play in 
engaging citizens.  But equally so, as a leader in Jamaica’s quest for 
modernization in public service and more efficient governance, he believes that a 
well-implemented access to information law is an instrument that governments 




Davis is one of a new breed of public servants determined to challenge a culture 
of secrecy, who will determine whether the host of legal and institutional changes 
described throughout this book lead to significant and lasting transformation in 
the relationship between those in power and the citizens they serve.  Although 
there is now widespread international recognition of the importance of 
establishing effective information regimes, there has not been the equivalent 
emphasis laid on the obstacles facing governments and citizens in ensuring its 
implementation.  Responding to the challenge of implementing transparency law 
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and policy demands leadership, resources, and the personal conviction of 
“transparency champions.”   
 
The actions of governments in the implementation phase are often related to the 
original motive or purpose for supporting a transparency law, and the manner in 
which the law was passed. When the access to information law was passed as 
part of an integrated policy or to meet an inherent need or civil society demand, 
there has tended to be greater commitment to implementation.  So, for some 
governments it is the desire for efficiency and modernization that drives them to 
pass access to information (ATI) laws (such as in Jamaica).  For others, it is the 
need to rebuild trust with its citizenry through the sharing of information and 
creation of new political space (President Mesa in Bolivia), or a commitment to 
the establishment of a new order based on human rights (South Africa during its 
democratic transition, 1994-99).  In Sinaloa, Mexico, the governor passed a 
comprehensive access to information law because he wanted his citizens to have 
faith in the State government, and therefore begin paying their taxes.  In these 
cases, there has generally been a greater emphasis on implementation so that 
the fruits of the law are received.  
 
But where a government has passed the law to satisfy an international financial 
institution as a “condition” for loan or debt relief or in order to join an 
intergovernmental organization, regional trade group or common market, its true 
commitment to full implementation may be in question.  For example, in both 
Nicaragua and Honduras, the executive branch included the passage of an 
access to information law as one of the conditions to receive debt relief under the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Program of the World Bank and IMF.  Both 
countries have suffered from a lack of enthusiasm from other sectors, and even 
passage of the law is in question.  
 
Whatever the underlying reason for establishing a transparency regime, after a 
decade of proliferation of access to information laws, with more than 50 countries 
now enjoying a legislated right to information, it is clear that the stimulus of both a 
supply of information and a demand for it is the key to meeting the policy 
objectives. This supply-demand intersection is a fundamental part of our 
hypothesis for effective implementation and use of the law. This paper will focus 
on the government side of the equation – the “supply side”  – where there is a 
new body of knowledge and learning arising from the legislative explosion of the 
past decade. Examples from Latin America, the Caribbean and South Africa will 
highlight then recent lessons. 
 
Notwithstanding the emphasis ion the “supply side”, ensuring the success of an 
ATI law is a matter of co-responsibility. Not all the burden lies with government: 
citizens, civil society and community organizations, media, and the private sector 
must take responsibility for monitoring government efforts and using the law. 
Without an adequately developed demand side, the law is likely to whither on the 
 3
vine. In other words, the demand and supply sides must match; and where they 
intersect will determine the quality of the transparency regime.  
 
 
A. The State of Play in Latin America, the Caribbean and South Africa 
 
Although the majority of Latin American countries have a right to information 
included in their constitution, these articles have been neither implemented nor 
enforced.  In recognition of these failures, in 2004 the Presidents and Prime 
Ministers of the Americas committed themselves to providing the legal framework 
for implementing the right to information.”iii    
 
At present, in addition to the United States and Mexico, in the Americas there 
exist only four countries with functioning access to information laws (Mexico, 
Peru, Jamaica, and Panama), two small Caribbean nations with less effective 
laws (Belize and Trinidad and Tobago), and newly passed laws in Ecuador and 
the Dominican Republic.  In Buenos Aires, Argentina there is a city access to 
information law, but the Federal Government has failed to pass similar 
legislation.  Citizens in other Latin American jurisdictions, such as Colombia, may 
apply for access to information based on provisions in dispersed laws, but do not 
yet enjoy a comprehensive right.  Enabling legislation is being debated or 
considered in almost all countries in Central America and the Caribbean, as well 
as South America, except for a notable absence of discussion in Cuba and 
Venezuela.iv 
 
The case is similar in Africa, where more than three years ago the Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression, reaffirming the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights provided a similar mandate to heads of state.  Like Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the African continent lags far behind the rest of the 
world on promulgation, implementation and enforcement of effective access to 
information laws, even though a number of African nations include the right to 
information in their constitutions.  Although a number of countries, including 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana and Mozambique, have draft bills that are under 
consideration and others have passed laws or Decrees that include some 
transparency principles, such as Mali, five years after South Africa passed its law 
in early 2000 it remains the sole nation which provides a comprehensive right to 
information. 
 
Much focus has been placed on passing access to information laws; model laws 
have been widely distributed, with specific versions provided for Africa and most 
recently Latin America and the Caribbeanv, and many countries around the world 
have heeded the call to enact this transparency tool. Nevertheless, experience 
has proven that passing the law is the easier task. Successful implementation of 
an open information regime is often the most challenging and energy consuming 
for government and civil society.  And yet, without effective implementation, an 
access to information law – however well drafted – will fail to meet the public 
policy objectives of transparency. 
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 B. Diagnosing the Implementation Challenge 
 
Until recent times, little attention has been paid to the theory and practice of 
implementation. Depending on the scope of the law, within each state there could 
be anywhere from all ministries and more than two hundred agencies, as in 
Jamaica, to the approximately 100,000 public authorities in the United Kingdom 
that must implement and administer the new transparency regime.  
 
In 2003, the Open Society Institute’s Justice Initiative (OSI) conducted a pilot 
monitoring study in five countries to assess the success of implementation 
efforts, and advance good implementation practices. vi  In each country, four 
different types of persons (non-governmental organization representatives, 
journalist, ordinary individual citizen, and  “excluded person”) submitted a total of 
approximately one hundred requests to eighteen different government agencies. 
The same request was made to each agency twice, by a different requester, in 
order to test whether the agency responded differently according to the type of 
person. In addition, there were three distinct classification of requests submitted, 
as determined by the pilot study organizers: routine, difficult, and sensitive.  
 
The results from the 2003 access to information monitoring study illuminate the 
challenges in meeting the implementation and transparency goals.  Of the 496 
requests for information filed in the five countries during the monitoring period, a 
total of 35.7%, or just over one in three requests, received the information 
sought.  Approximately half of the requests (49.6%) received the information or 
written refusals within the time periods established in the respective laws.vii  This 
is clearly progress toward transparency. As the report noted, “the five monitored 
countries are all introducing new standards of government transparency, while 
undergoing democratic transitions.  In this context, both outcomes – compliance 
with international FOI [Freedom of Information] standards in almost 50 percent of 
the cases, and the provision of information in response to 35 percent of requests, 
can be see as a solid basis for building greater openness.” viii 
 
Unfortunately, the OSI report also records that over one third of requests met 
with complete silence or lack of response from the authorities. In terms of these 
“mute refusals”, as the survey refers to them, South Africa fared the worst with  
63% of the properly submitted requests completely requested.  As the country 
report on South Africa comments, “these results are of particular concern given 
that South Africa’s FOI law, the 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA), the first of its kind in Africa, has been hailed as a model for other African 
countries.”ix  Even though the South African law may be the best drafted and 
most comprehensive among the five test countries, in terms of compliance with 
international standards and best practice, only 23% of requests were successful, 
compared with 34% for Macedonia, which had no legal right to access 
information, Armenia with a 41% received rate, and the best performing Peru 
with 42%.  The OSI report on South Africa noted, “a common feature of the
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bodies which performed well in the monitoring was that they had made a serious 
commitment to implementing the law and believed in its potential.”  This 
monitoring exercise helps illustrate that even the best laws can be rendered 
meaningless when the myriad of implementation challenges are not addressed.   
 
  
C. The Transparency Triangle 
 
Constructing an effective transparency regime should be seen as a three-phase 
process:  passage, implementation, and enforcement of the access to 
information law. These three elements together constitute the “transparency 
triangle.” All three are crucial and interrelated in the establishment of a robust 
transparency scheme; but experience indicates that the implementation phase is 
paramount and serves as the base of the triangle.  Without full and effective 
implementation, the right to information becomes just another example of the 
“hyper-inflation” of new laws that serve no one.x  Moreover, implementation, and 
the ultimate success of the law in meeting its objectives, is driven both by supply 
and demand.  The government must create the supply of information, through 
record-making, organized recordkeeping, and trained professional civil servants. 
Civil society must provide a demand.  While many of the chapters in this book 
describe struggles to pass laws, the focus in this chapter is on what happens 
thereafter.   
 
II. Setting the Stage 
 
Implementation depends heavily on the conditions under which a law is enacted.  
Three points are crucial: the degree of societal involvement in the demand for 
and drafting of the legislation; alternative approaches taken by the government; 
and embedding provisions for implementation into the law. 
 
A. Instituting a new information regime: the process 
 
In terms of legitimacy, sustained monitoring, and usage, the process through 
which the new access to information law is conceived and promulgated is critical.  
As discussed above, governments may choose to provide this right to information 
for a variety of reasons: a new constitution is drafted; a new administration or 
faltering ruler is seeking methods to fight corruption; in response to a government 
scandal or public health crisis; to meet provisions for acceptance to multilateral 
organizations; or to comply with international treaties and agreements.  But it is 
when civil society has played a significant role in advocating for the law and 
lobbying around the key provisions that the information regime has tended to 
truly flourish, thus overcoming the “check the box” syndrome.  In countries such 
as South Africa, Bulgaria, India, Mexico, Peru and Jamaica, widespread civil 
society campaigns augmented and encouraged the government efforts to pass 
enabling legislation.  Where such a campaign has occurred, the law has enjoyed 
greater credibility and use.  There is more significant buy-in from society, as 
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representatives have a greater stake in the law’s success.  And, therefore, the 
law is more likely to be implemented as failure of the government or information 
holders to comply with its terms will be noticed and challenged.   
 
In Jamaica, for example, a diverse group from civil society worked together to 
seek amendments to the proposed law and to fight for more robust legislation.  
This coalition included such strange bedfellows as human rights and democracy 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the journalists’ association, prominent 
media owners and private sector representatives, and the Civil Service 
Association.xi  Many of these same actors have remained engaged in monitoring 
government’s implementation efforts, and in using the law. In South Africa, the 
Open Democracy Campaign Group that worked together from 1995-2000 to push 
for a strong law to give effect to the constitutional right to access information 
enshrined in the country’s new 1996 constitution, included human rights NGOs, 
church organizations, environmental pressure groups and the powerful trade 
union umbrella body COSATU.xii  These advocacy efforts translated into a 
constituency willing and eager to use the new instrument, and prepared to 
monitor government’s implementation and enforcement performance.  
 
In countries where civil society was not engaged in the debate, the right to 
information has atrophied and the law never fully implemented. Belize passed its 
Freedom of Information law in 1994, one of the first countries in the hemisphere 
to do so.  It was accomplished with little public or parliamentary debate and no 
civil society involvement.  For the past decade the law has been used only a 
handful of times, and rarely with success.  When asked, NGO leaders indicated 
minimal knowledge of the law and little faith in its ability to promote greater 
transparency.xiii 
 
In the worst cases, when there is no participatory process, laws are passed that 
are contrary to the principles of openness and limit freedom of information and 
expression, such as was seen in both Zimbabwe and Paraguay.xiv In contrast, 
Peru presently enjoys a comprehensive access to information law that was 
drafted with a wide sector of civil society involvement, support from the 
Ombudsman’s office, and extensive consultations with the armed forces.  
However, the right to information was not new to Peru.  In response to the 
collapse of the Fujimori dictatorship and the pervasive allegations of government 
corruption, in 2000, the interim president Valentine Paniagua issued a 
presidential decree supporting a right to public information held by the executive.  
Laudable in its purpose, this unilateral decree was not fully applied or utilized. 
Although the newly passed legislation does not greatly expand on the decree, the 
manner in which it was promulgated, with civil society advocacy and debate, has 
led to increased legitimacy, implementation, and use.    
 
B. Vanguard Steps 
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Like Paniagua, governments are increasingly seeking means to demonstrate 
their commitment to transparency before completion of the lawmaking and 
implementation phases.  If the process of passing the law includes consensus 
building and sufficient time for effective implementation, it potentially could be 
years before persons may fully exercise their right to information.  Moreover, in 
some contexts the fragmentation, weakness, or skepticism of the legislature has 
blocked the passage of a comprehensive law.  In an attempt to satisfy citizen 
desire for more immediate results and to learn critical implementation lessons 
earlier, executives are experimenting with tools other than legislation, such as 
Supreme Decrees and voluntary openness strategies. 
 
For example, in Peru, Argentina and Bolivia supreme decrees that carry the 
weight of law were issued to promote transparency.  Supreme decrees can be 
accomplished quickly, demonstrate government commitment and political will, 
begin the process of shifting the culture of secrecy, provide implementation 
experience, and serve as a platform for the more extensive legislation. But there 
are also striking disadvantages.  First, supreme decrees apply exclusively to the 
Executive, leaving aside completely the other branches of government and the 
private sector.  Moreover, they often serve as a pseudo-panacea minimally 
satisfying the call for openness, but potentially slowing down the passage of a 
comprehensive right to information law.  As they do not engage the legislature, 
they are rarely (if ever) accompanied by a budget for implementation.  Worse, 
supreme decrees often do not often follow an inclusive process of drafting and 
consultation, thus less opportunity for building legitimacy and buy-in.  Finally, if 
not effectively implemented, a supreme decree, like a law, can raise unrequited 
expectations and de-legitimize positive government efforts.  
 
In Bolivia, the passage of a Supreme Decree for Transparency and Access to 
Information has proved particularly detrimental.  Following the issuance of the 
January 2004 Decree, which provided a right of access to a limited class of 
documents, media representatives and some civil society groups strongly 
rejected the effort.  Failure to consult with these relevant stakeholders and poorly 
drafted exemptions provided sufficient fuel for key groups to publicly denounce 
the Decree.   Since its initial announcement, there have been few efforts to 
systematically implement its provisions, and most recently it was shelved 
pending further civil society and media engagement.  Most damaging, this 
experience has caused some sectors to distrust further access to information 
initiatives, including proposed comprehensive legislation.  
 
In Argentina the Supreme Decree for Transparency, issued by President 
Kirchner in February 2004, initially enjoyed greater public support.  In contrast to 
the Bolivia case, it was issued in response to over five years of civil society 
demand for the right to information.  In the wake of the 2002 economic collapse 
and presidential resignations, fearful and disorganized members of the Lower 
House passed the draft access to information law.  As the political parties 
regrouped and regained some legitimacy, they no longer saw the need for such a 
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threatening piece of legislation and blocked its passage in the Senate.  The only 
recourse was a supreme decree. However, as with the Peru example, the decree 
has not satisfied the need for a law and civil society groups continue their 
campaign.xv 
 
Short of a legally binding tool, governments are increasingly considering pilot 
projects as a vanguard to an access to information law.  Voluntary Openness 
Strategies (VOS) and Codes for Transparency, such as the United Kingdom’s 
Publication Schema, can serve to begin the transformation from a culture of 
secrecy to one of openness and as a platform for the more comprehensive right 
to information legislation.  Focusing the VOS on a few key pilot ministries and 
agencies that agree to provide an extensive range of information to citizens can 
prepare the ground for effective implementation of a transparency law, when 
ultimately passed.  These pilot bodies have the opportunity to develop best 
practices and to become “islands of transparency.”    
 
Other pilot projects could include release of certain classes of documents across 
government, or all information related to a particular theme. In India, the Ford 
Foundation recently has agreed to fund a “model district” whereby intensive 
focus is placed on one district to “address all micro-issues and nuances involved 
in implementation” and demonstrate what is possible.xvi  The World Bank, in 
response to activist demands, appears prepared to begin such a pilot project 
when it begins a one-year experimental public release of key documents 
simultaneously with their submission to the board.xvii  These pilot projects may 
serve to satisfy some user demand, while concurrently preparing governmental 
bodies for the more extensive rollout of transparency measures. 
   
C. Drafting the Law: Taking Account of the Implementation Challenge 
 
Finally, when writing an access to information law it is important to take into 
consideration the processes and procedures necessary for its effective 
implementation and full enforcement.  When drafting or debating the proposed 
legislation it is easy to become overly preoccupied with the exemptions section of 
the bill, to the exclusion of other key provisions.  While national security 
exceptions may be more interesting and controversial than the implementation 
procedures, they are often much less important in determining the bill’s overall 
effectiveness in promoting real transparency.  In Peru, there were months of 
productive meetings between the Press Council of Peru and the armed forces to 
negotiate and agree on the national security exemptions.  However, this same 
energy was not placed in designing the archival system or appeals process. To 
date, one of the difficulties with the Peruvian legislation is its weakness in 
independent and judicial remedies for aggrieved requestors. 
  
Focusing exclusively on the exemptions’ section is misguided.  In reality, if 
governments are determined to withhold information, for whatever reason, they 
will do so regardless of the exactness with which the exceptions to access are 
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written in the law.  Thus, more emphasis must be given to the procedures for 
legal challenge when and if the exemptions are used as a shield to hide behind. 
Issues such as mandatory publication of certain information, time limits for 
completion of information requests, administrative duty to assist the requester, 
costs for requests and copying, sanctions for failure to comply, reporting 
requirements, and appeals procedures, must receive much greater attention 
when considering the draft law.  It is these practicalities that ultimately will 
determine the value and usability of such a law for ordinary citizens.  
 
For example, there needs to be greater detail placed in the law or regulations, in 
relation to the procedures for implementing and applying the legislation. In 
countries such as South Africa, where civil servants are accustomed to following 
laws with great deference, it proved critical to provide for all the implementation 
mechanisms within the law, and limit discretionality.  Moreover, with greater 
exactitude in the law, it is easier to hold government departments to account for 
failure to properly implement the law.  In other words, it is easier to demand and 
get adequate implementation of systems and procedures where the law is clear 
and specific, with sufficient level of detail, than where it is vague or too general.  
 
Two additional legislation-drafting issues deserve brief mention. First, principles 
for good record making and records-management should be included within the 
access to information law.   The specifics can be detailed through regulations, 
but it is helpful to have clear statements of purpose related to information 
systems as part of the access to information mandate. 
 
Second, the primacy of the ATI law must be clearly stated within the law’s text.  
There is often other extant legislation that deals with information - whether it is a 
law on Archiving, Official Secrets, the Armed Forces, Banking, or Public 
Administration. Canvassing the multitude of laws that speak to the issue of 
information would be difficult and time-consuming both for the requester and the 
civil servant tasked with responding.  Arguably, if a public servant were expected 
to review each potential law and article related to the subject matter of each 
request, the response time would be enormous and the result likely to be a 
denial.  To eliminate conflict of laws, promote full implementation, and reduce 
confusion among stakeholders, it is critical that the access to information law is 
the primary legislation. It should clearly state within the legislation that the ATI 
law governs all requests, and captures all exceptions to release.   
 
The state of Sinaloa, Mexico has one of the most advanced and modern access 
to information laws in the region.  Passed before the federal law, it has been in 
effect for almost two years.  During this initial period of application, the 
government has identified the failure to explicitly state the primacy of the law as 
one of its major flaws.  Because of the problems and delays encountered, such 
as confusion and opportunity to subvert the objectives of openness, the 
implementers are already requesting an amendment or modification to clearly 
state that in questions of information, the access to information law will govern.          
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III. Implementation of the Law 
 
Robust implementation is very difficult to achieve, and thus far insufficient 
attention has been paid to the obstacles and potential solutions to overcome 
them.   As the British Minister responsible for its Freedom of Information law 
argued the year before it came into effect “Implementation has been beset by 
three problems . . .A lack of leadership.  Inadequate support for those who are 
administering access requests.  And a failure to realize that Freedom of 
Information implementation is not an event: it is a process which demands long-
term commitment.”xviii    
 
A. The Politics of Implementation 
 
i. Political Will and Mindshift 
 
Effective implementation demands political commitment from the top, both to 
ensure that the necessary resources are allocated and to overcome entrenched 
mindsets of opacity. The resource demands are significant, particularly in 
societies where a culture of secrecy has dominated the past and where there are 
no processes already in place to facilitate the archiving and retrieval of 
documents. 
 
Most governments are accustomed to working in a secretive fashion. The notion 
of transparency is invariably far beyond the range of experience and mindset of 
most public bureaucrats. Therefore, a fundamental mind-shift is necessary, which 
must be prefaced with political will for a change in approach. The mindset of 
opacity is a common feature, as it seems that in general bureaucrats have 
developed an ingrained sense of ownership about the records for which they are 
responsible. Releasing them to the public is akin to ceding control and, therefore, 
power. 
 
Moreover, robust information regimes can take an enormous amount of energy 
and resources.  Daily, governments are faced with a myriad of priorities and the 
reality that there are not enough resources in the national reserves to meet all of 
the demands. In a recent study of efforts to implement the new law in Great 
Britain, the Constitutional Affairs Committee received a submission from the local 
government association stating, “that resources are the single most important 
issue in FOI compliance.”xix  It went on to explain, “[B] y far the largest issue for 
local authorities is the lack of resources.  They do not have the time, money or 
personnel to easily organize information on a corporate basis in order to allow 
ready retrieval for FOI purposes.” 
 
Thus, once the access to information law is passed, there are some governments 
that claim credit for the passage but fail to follow through to ensure that the law 
will succeed in practice.  While others, realizing the enormity of the tasks 
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necessary to implement the law, fail to commit the appropriate resources or 
simply lose interest.  Still others that have demonstrated the requisite political will 
may find it difficult to sustain. The indicators of political will vary from country to 
country, but some such signals might include the government’s preparedness to 
underpin the right to information in the constitution (such as the case of South 
Africa), the government’s willingness to accept and encourage citizen 
participation in the process of writing the law, or the provision of sufficient and 
continued resource allocations.  Whatever the specific method, political will must 
be signaled clearly, and from the very top, if the task of entrenching a new culture 
of openness is to survive the beyond the implementation challenges and for the 
long-term.  
ii. 
In Jamaica, we had the privilege to lead implementation workshops for senior 
public servants.  In these retreats for permanent secretaries and information 
officers, we asked what would be necessary to ensure adequate implementation.  
The resounding answer was resource allocation and political will.  Interestingly, 
when asked what would be a demonstration of political will, the civil servants 
responded “resource allocation.”  Unfortunately, in Jamaica and many countries 
with new information regimes, national and ministerial budgets are not prepared 
with clear line items for access to information, thus mandating implementers to 
find monies from other pots, or take on additional responsibilities and costs 
without an increase in resources.  As leading scholar Alasdair Roberts noted in 
his recent research, “the budget for central guidance of the British FOI 
implementation effort exceeded the budget of the Jamaican Access to 
Information Unit (with its staff of four); the government’s Archives and Records 
Department; the other parts of the Prime Minister’s Office; and the Jamaican 
houses of Parliament - - combined.”xx 
 
A major part of the fight for financial resources entails determining the specific 
needs.  This is not a simple task. However, in general, costs for a new 
information regime include three categories: start-up, ongoing, and exceptional.  
Start-up costs may include a study of the extant archiving and record-keeping 
system; development of a new archiving system; preliminary training of civil 
servants; equipment purchases for processing request like photocopiers and 
printers, and expenses related to hiring and setting-up a new coordinating unit for 
information.  Recurring costs would include annual salaries and benefits for 
information officers, ongoing training related to recordkeeping and the law, 
promotional and awareness raising activities, overhead and rental for related 
offices, equipment maintenance fees, paper and other costs related to provision 
of documents.  The exceptional category may cover items such as extraordinary 
litigation costs or large seminars.   
 
In practice, many of the resources applied toward satisfying the access to 
information regime needs are drawn from existing budgeted items.  For instance, 
rather than hire a new staff person, already employed civil servants are tasked 
with additional responsibilities, computers are used for more than one purpose, 
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or overhead costs are not broken-down.  Specific cost information is available in 
only a few countries in the Western Hemispheric, and generally only in those like 
Mexico where there is a separate line item in the overall budget.  However, there 
are some cost figures that can guide the discussion. For example, in Mexico the 
first annual budget for the Federal Institute for Access to Information was US$25 
million.  This provides the “Rolls Royce” version of access to information, such as 
a brand new building, staff of over 150, and an advanced Internet based system 
that would make major corporations jealous.  In Mexico, the government expends 
approximately .033% of GDP on their access to information regime. Other 
countries have much more limited expenditures, such as the estimated US 
.0007% of GDP or Canada’s .004%.    
 
The political fight for resources is easier to wage when the benefits are 
quantified.  In terms of money saved from reduced corruption, in Buenos Aires a 
transparency pilot project was initiated in the public hospitals whereby 
procurements for medical items, such as needles, bandages, surgical gloves, 
and plastic items were made public.  The result was a savings of 50%, merely 
through the publication of contract bids. A similar exercise was conducted for 
Mexico’s largest public university, with a like outcome due to greater 
transparency.  This does not even take into account the benefit of increased 
foreign investment, or increased confidence in government – not to mention 
greater efficiency in administration.  In Mali, a recent internal organization of 
records of government employees and persons receiving government salary 
demonstrated over one thousand “ghost employees,” persons benefiting from 
government payroll without doing any work. 
 
Nevertheless, in light of increasing social demands and worsening economies, 
governments continue to face the political dilemma of servicing the needs of the 
access to information regime over other programming, and articulating the overall 
benefit (vs. cost) of good governance.  
 
iii.ii. Who Leads the Efforts 
 
The agency or individual tasked with leading the effort to implement the new 
access to information regime is a political decision that may determine whether 
the law succeeds. Nominating a lead implementer with sufficient seniority, 
respect, and power will provide the foundational message to other parts of the 
administration, public service and civil society that the government is serious in 
its efforts.   As the Canadian Information Officer stated in his annual report to 
Parliament, the person charged with implementing the access to information 
must be sufficiently senior that he or she is confident in making the difficult 
decisions and must carry the weight to encourage others in promoting the 
objectives of transparency through the release of information. “Good policies . . . 
need champions if they are to be effectively implemented.”xxi In identifying 
leaders, it is important to cultivate these “champions” at key nodal points in 
Government.  The political leadership of persons such as Jamaican Carlton 
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Davis or Guadalupe Cajias, the Bolivian Presidential Delegate for Anti-
Corruption, has assured that implementation efforts continue, even in the face of 
political and logistical obstacles.  By placing the key implementer in the Ministry 
of the Presidency or Prime Minister, as is the case in Jamaica, Bolivia and 
Nicaragua, there is a greater likelihood of political support and acquiescence by 
the other line Ministries. On the other hand, when implementation is spread 
across line function ministries, as is the case in South Africa, there is a possibility 
that peer ministries will ignore directives and that implementation efforts will 
wane.  
 
In South Africa, the initial impetus for an access to information regime came from 
the Deputy President’s office just one year after the transition to democracy in 
early 1995, when then deputy president Thabo Mbeki appointed a Task Force to 
produce a white paper on access to information. The Task Force was high level 
including one of Mbeki’s most trusted lieutenants and one of the country’s most 
highly regarded human rights scholars.  Though its report attracted much 
attention, as the process of finalizing the law became protracted the energy of 
the Task Force dissipated.  Ultimately, responsibility for the final passage of the 
law was transferred to the Ministry of Justice, one of the busiest departments of 
government and one that has proved to be singularly ill-equipped to master the 
challenge of implementation. Political leadership has been conspicuous by its 
absence. At a meeting between the then Minister of Justice Penual Maduna and 
a group of visiting deputies from Armenia in January 2003, the Minister appeared 
ill-briefed on the implementation of the law and informed his visitors that his 
department was fully complying with the law and not been the subject of any 
appeals. This was inaccurate. Not only have there been several appeals against 
refusal, but his department was at the time the subject of two pieces of litigation 
under the Act.   This absence of leadership in implementing the law, seen also in 
Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, has led to inconsistent implementation and 
compliance with the law.  
 
 
iv.iii. Public Servants: On the Front Line 
 
Public servants are on the front-line of implementation.  As such, this critical 
stakeholder must be engaged early and strategically in the process of 
establishing and implementing the law.   Ultimately, it is this constituency that will 
be responsible with making the law meaningful for users - - and have the power 
to either facilitate the process or create unnecessary roadblocks. 
 
Civil servants, as the face of government, have grown accustomed to being 
blamed for all range of problems and citizens’ grievances.  Although having no 
control over policy decisions, it is the civil servants who are tasked with their 
implementation.  Moreover, public functionaries often must contend with 
contradictory roles and responsibilities, and competing interests.  An access to 
information law can add to the discomfort as access to information coordinators 
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“on occasion, experience an uncomfortable conflict between their responsibilities 
under the access to information act and their career prospects within their 
institution.”xxii  
 
However, as developing democracies seek to professionalize the public service, 
tools such as access to information can support this objective.  In Bolivia during a 
recent workshop on access to information implementation, the civil servants 
identified an access to information law as a means of protecting themselves from 
arbitrary decision-making by politicians and a way to diminish untoward political 
pressures.  These more senior public functionaries also listed such benefits as 
increasing efficiency, reducing bureaucracy, and identifying and eliminating 
bottlenecks. 
 
In Jamaica, the civil service association recognized the opportunity the access to 
information law provided them to enhance customer service and more clearly 
demonstrate who was responsible for poor policy choices, i.e. the political 
masters.  Thus, Mr. Wayne Jones, the President of the Civil Service Association 
accepted a lead role in promoting the passage and implementation of a 
comprehensive access to information law.  The unions stance also has led to 
greater buy-in from the relevant front-line workers. 
 
B. Government System-building: Developing the Supply Side 
 
Governments must establish the internal systems and processes to generate and 
provide information, and train of civil servants to ensure understanding and 
compliance – the mechanics of the supply side.   
 
    i. Recordkeeping and Archiving 
 
If there are no records to be found, or they are so unorganized that locating them 
becomes an insurmountable obstacle, the best access to information law is 
meaningless. In order to respond to information requests, an adequate 
information management system must be designed and established. This is not 
an easy task.xxiii  
 
Many countries that have recently passed ATI laws, such as Mexico and Peru, 
have rather precarious record-keeping traditions. In previously authoritarian 
governments, such as South Africa, many records have been lost or deliberately 
destroyed.  Government officials in Argentina tell of their difficulty in receiving 
documents necessary to complete their work, often due to inadequate record 
keeping and organization systems. In 2002, an analysis was undertaken by the 
Anti-Corruption Office (AO) of Argentina to determine the prevalence of civil 
servants receiving multiple paychecks.  The AO found that the greatest obstacle 
to assessing and stopping this illegal practice that was costing the country 
millions of dollars was a lack of a functioning database and systematized 
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records.xxiv   It proved nearly impossible to get the most basic information of the 
number of positions and the names of the persons employed in these jobs. 
 
Governments generate millions of tons of paper each year. In some countries, a 
lack of recordkeeping processes and space constraints have translated into huge 
bonfires of critical documents.  Until a few years ago, Bolivia burned most of the 
over 192 tons of paper that the executive branch generated each year. In other 
countries such as Jamaica where there has been a long history of secrecy but 
emphasis on document retention, both passed down from the British colonial rule 
that ended 40 years ago, there are mountains of documents, which have never 
been properly recorded or archived.   
 
In many places, until the advent of access to information regimes, national 
archivists and record-keepers had been considered more akin to untrained 
secretaries, rather than degreed professionals, and were not provided the 
resources or respect necessary to fulfill their mandate.  As one records manager 
stated, ”traditionally, recordkeeping in the Jamaican public service has been an 
arcane and often overlooked field.  Records management continues to be 
perceived as a low-level administrative/clerical function, largely focused on the 
management of public records at the end of their life cycle (i.e. the disposition 
phase).”xxv 
 
In fact, in many government agencies, it was the secretary that was tasked with 
filing and maintaining all critical documents. However, as computers have 
become more commonplace, secretarial staff have been reduced, further 
depleting record-keeping resources.xxvi  A recent report of the United States 
Interagency Committee on Government Information addressed the need to 
improve accountability for records management.  The report highlighted the “low 
priority assigned to information and records management” and recommended 
that “agencies must have an expectation that their actions have important 
positive or negative consequences, and there needs to be an effective 
mechanism for evaluating agency actions.”xxvii  The Committee suggested that 
appropriate incentives be established for proper management and protection of 
records as “valuable Government assets.”  
 
Perhaps more damaging to the establishment and maintenance of files is the 
widespread misconception by civil servants and elected officials that the 
documents they generate belong to them.  We have heard this view from 
Argentina, to Bolivia, to Jamaica and Belize, all the way to the US State of 
Georgia.  Thus, when leaving their post or retiring, they take the files home with 
them – such that they are forever lost to the archiving system. 
 
Even when available, the task of ordering all of these past documents is 
monumental, and potentially unrealizable.  In terms of human and financial 
resources, the start up costs can become astronomical when the organization of 
hundreds of years of documents is contemplated.  Rather than allow this to 
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become an insurmountable obstacle to the government’s willingness to pass the 
law, some advocates pragmatically suggest that in the initial stages of an 
information regime, governments ignore past documents and, rather, establish 
an archiving system for future information.  In terms of citizen needs, it is often 
the contemporary documents such as budgets, policy decisions related to 
education and health, and information on crime and justice that are of greatest 
value.  Governments concerned with scarce resource allocation, such as 
Nicaragua, have considered focusing their recordkeeping reforms on current and 
future generated documents, and then over time ordering the vast quantity of 
historical information.    
  
Electronic documents have created a new set of problems and needs for 
recordkeeping and archiving.  A comparative study of the implementation of 
access to information laws in the Commonwealth of Australia, New South Wales, 
Queensland and New Zealand found that “across all four jurisdictions, we 
encountered concern bordering on alarm at the implications of the growth of e-
mail.  We encountered few examples of systematic filing and destruction of 
email, nor of any central protocols for how emails should be stored.”xxviii  As the 
modern trend of electronic communication and documentation continues, record-
keeping systems will need to respond. 
 
Part of this process of organizing and identifying records involves the creation of 
“roadmaps” of the documents that exist. This is as important for the holders of 
information as it is for the potential requesters. Without knowing what records 
there are, and where they are located, it is hard to imagine an implementation 
regime that will be anything other than frustrating for both holders and 
requesters. Six months after the Jamaica law came into effect, senior civil 
servants stated that one of the greatest advantages of the law, thus far, is their 
own increased knowledge of government and the records that various agencies 
hold.  For this reason, many modern ATI laws such as the South African, 
Mexican and Jamaican include provisions mandating the creation of such 
‘roadmaps’.   
 
Recordkeeping - the management of documents on a daily basis - is inextricable 
linked to the archiving of historical or critical information.  Unfortunately, in some 
countries the archival laws are inconsistent with modern recordkeeping systems 
(particularly in relation to electronic records) or provide regulations in conflict with 
access to information laws.  In Jamaica, for example, the archivist has discretion 
whether to release documents, and the decision is not based on public interest or 
principles of transparency.  Thus, there also exists a need to ensure consistency 
within the record management policies. As the US electronic records policy 
working group has pointed out,  “To be accountable for information and records 
management requirements, agencies must have a clear understanding of what 
needs to be done and how to do it . . . If agencies are provided with a clear set of 
standards that are made understandable through the educational opportunities 
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and there are effective mechanisms for evaluating agency actions, the odds for a 
successful outcome are significantly improved.”xxix 
 
 
ii. Record Making 
 
There is no value in a right to access to information, if no reliable document 
exists. Record-making standards must also develop and mature.  One Bolivian 
public administration expert commented that most of the documents presently 
generated by his government are trash, and are created simply to satisfy some 
administrative requirement with no clear understanding of the public servant as to 
its use or importance: “That which is certain is that the public entities generate 
and accumulate incalculable volumes of information that for the  
most part have no utility from the perspective of efficacy, efficiency and economy 
of its operations.”xxx    
 
On the other end of the spectrum, as governments become aware of the depth 
and breadth of information that is open to the public, there is sometimes a 
backlash to information generation.  Fear of embarrassment or mistakes may 
portend the rise of “cellphone governance.”  Important policy decisions are made 
at lunches, via telephone or simply are not recorded.  An Arkansas appeals court 
recently ruled that the Fort Smith board of directors and city administrator 
violated the State’s freedom of information act and open meetings provisions 
when a decision to purchase property was made via telephone.  The Court found 
that telephone conversations are a “meeting” under the terms of the act, holding 
that “It is obvious that [the board’s] actions resulted in a consensus being 
reached on a given issue, thus rendering the formal meeting held before the 
public a mere charade  . . . By no reasonable construction can the FOIA be read 
to permit governmental decision-makers to engage in secret deal-making . . .”xxxi  
 
As this practice becomes more common, access to information laws will need to 
respond with more detailed provisions relating to record making.  Similar to the 
rule-making procedures in the United States and the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act of 1997 in Australia, to curtail the deleterious effects of 
cellphone governance, policy makers must be mandated to keep records that, at 
a minimum, detail: who made a decision; when the decision was taken; why the 
decision was made; and list the relevant sources used to make the decision.xxxii   
 
iii. Automatic Publication 
 
The best approach for dealing with vast amounts of information is simply to make 
as many records as possible automatically and unconditionally available.  This 
limits the need for government decision-making, and is therefore less of a drain 
on resources.  Moreover, it is clearly better for the “demand side”, as proactive 
disclosure reduces the number of requests and delay in information receipt.  
Indeed, the best implementation model is not only to categorize as much 
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information as possible as automatically disclosable, but also to publish the 
information at the point the record is created. This is what in Freedom of 
Information lexicon is known as the “right to know” (RTK) approach.  Information 
and Communication technologies makes this easier and cheaper. In Peru, for 
example, during the transitional government authority in 2001 when greater 
transparency was a watchword of the interim government’s approach, the 
Department of Finance led the way with a website-based approach to 
transparency, publishing huge volumes of information. A focus on automatic 
publication through the Internet has continued with the National Office of Anti-
Corruption tasked with monitoring the development of public body websites and 
periodically issuing reports. The most recent report, the sixth of the series, found 
that all government ministries were in compliance with the automatic publication 
provisions of the access to information law, and 37.3 percent of the decentralized 
public agencies were in full compliance.   In comparison, in the municipalities 
there was only 2.1 percent complete compliance.xxxiii 
 
Clearly, using government websites is an important way of adopting a RTK 
approach, but there are dangers too. It should not be seen as a panacea, 
especially in the developing world, where few people have access to the 
Internet.xxxiv  Moreover, with the changing technologies, even the most current 
advances may quickly become outdated.  Thus, any electronic record-keeping or 
publication scheme should be seen as a companion to hard copies and 
traditional publication, rather than as a substitute.   
 
iv. Internal Systems 
 
1. Internal Procedures (the “internal law”) 
 
It is crucial that governments develop – and users understand – clear guidelines 
for the civil servants charged with implementing the law.  To ensure consistency 
and efficiency in implementation, the guidelines should cover: records 
management; assessing requests for information; provision of documents; and 
interpretation of the law. 
 
For users, applying to access the record of the internal system is one way of 
discovering the extent to which a government agency is taking the 
implementation issue seriously.xxxv  Things to look out for would be training and 
the development of a manual for line managers and information officers and/or 
their units, and internal rules relating to good practice and important procedural 
matters such as compliance with time limits. Also, there should be a thorough 
internal system for recording requests, such as an electronic database that can 
itself by subjected to public and parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
Given its history and role in the oppression perpetrated by the apartheid state, it 
is somewhat surprising and ironic that in South Africa the Department of Defence 
has, of the twenty-six national government departments, shown the greatest 
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commitment to implementing the law properly. A Johannesburg-based NGO, the 
South African History Archive (SAHA), had already discovered that Defence was 
performing surprisingly well when, in contrast to other departments, it dealt with 
many of the requests SAHA submitted efficiently and courteously. SAHA’s 
diagnosis accorded with that of the OSI study and ODAC’s own assessment, the 
Department of Defence had put in place a number of specific steps to implement 
the Act, which when emulated in other agencies could serve to support their 
implementation efforts. These measures included:  
 
A manual and implementation plan; 
A register of all requests;  
Human resource allocation to the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA) even though there is no special budget;  
The CEO is the Information Officer and all division chiefs act as Deputy 
Information Officers, with assistants handling PAIA requests;  
A PAIA sub-committee is established, which deals with major issues – e.g. 
disclosing information on the arms procurement contracts, sensitive 
information and large volume requests;  
Provincial departments send the requests to the head office to process.  
 
In contrast, bodies performing badly had either not instituted systems or the 
systems were not functioning.xxxvi  
 
 
2. Information Officers and Training 
 
In addition to internal systems, there is a need for line managers responsible for 
implementation and responding to requests. Most modern ATI laws create 
information officers or similar positions.  In Canada, access to information 
coordinators have been the backbone of implementation and administration 
efforts.  Similarly, the Mexican, Peruvian, and draft Bolivian Access to 
Information Acts call for the establishment of designated information units or 
officers in each public body, tasked with assisting applicants and serves as the 
frontline respondent.   
 
One obvious way to test the strength of implementation is whether such officials 
have in fact been appointed and whether they received specialist training.xxxvii  A 
comparative study of four commonwealth jurisdictions found “there was universal 
agreement that a significant investment had to be made in training” and that the 
training should “encompass both general staff (at all levels) and FOI 
coordinators/specialists (where such existed).”xxxviii Moreover, training should not 
end when the law goes into effect.  Staff changes, lessons learned, and 
amendments to internal policies and procedures, dictate the need for continual 
training of Information Officers and other relevant civil servants. 
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The public needs to know whom to contact and how to reach this designated 
official. Most modern ATI laws include such requirements. The South African law, 
for example, requires government to have the name and contact details of the 
information and deputy information officers listed in all telephone directories. 
 
These Information Officers can work together, through the establishment of 
networks or working groups, to share best practices and lessons learned.  In 
Jamaica, the Information Officers meet periodically and serve as a mutual 
support system.  These networks also serve to demonstrate the value and 
professionalism of the position.     
 
3. Implementation Plan: the Value of Strategic Planning & Consensus-building 
 
If governments are wise, they will consult with the potential user community they 
will consult with the potential user community when they draw up their 
implementation plan. One of the causes for optimism in the Jamaican case is that 
despite its government’s historical culture of secrecy, the access to information 
implementation unit carried out an implementation consultancy exercise with civil 
society in August 2002, soon after the law was passed and again in March 
2003xxxix. This process enabled government officials to share, in a positive and 
confidential setting, their own concerns with colleagues across government and 
individuals from civil society. For the latter group, it enabled them to develop a 
better understanding of the obstacles facing civil servants but also an opportunity 
to hold them to account.  
 
The first workshop asked the simple question: “what needs to happen to 
effectively implement the new Access to Information law?” The workshop 
identified a lack of political will and resources – human and financial – as the 
chief obstacles to effective implementation. The second workshop focused on 
prioritizing key activities. It found that some aspects, such as the appointment 
and training of access to information officers and passage of the necessary 
regulations to operationalize the Act, had been neglected.  In the end, these 
sessions of shared experiences and problem solving allowed government to take 
the necessary decision to postpone implementation with less fear of civil society 
reprisal.  
 
As the Jamaica example demonstrates, it is often managerial weaknesses rather 
than flagging political will that slows down implementation or causes the greatest 
obstacles.  The delay in putting the Jamaica law into effect had much more to do 
with lack of preparedness than government fear.  In Great Britain, parliament 
heard evidence from government departments that a failure to share best 
practice across sectors led to delays and inconsistent messages.xl  Thus, 
identifying key managerial or logistical weaknesses sharing lessons learned, and 
providing consistent guidance will allow administrators to apply resources more 
wisely, in a focused and efficient manner. 
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4. Specialized ATI Implementation and Coordination Units 
 
In both Mexico and Jamaica, specialized access to information units have been 
established within government.  These entities are responsible for assisting and 
monitoring implementation, raising awareness about the new right to information, 
and providing a clear focal point for all efforts.  A designated specialist unit, such 
as the Mexican Federal Institute for Access to Information (IFAI) or the Jamaican 
Access to Information Unit, allows the government to provide a uniform and 
focused response to problems and demonstrates clear commitment.  In contrast, 
in Peru, each ministry or agency is to have a designated access to information 
person, but there is no federal coordinating body. In South Africa, no special unit 
has been established to oversee implementation; on the contrary, the 
responsibility for the ATI law has been simply added to the long list of 
responsibilities ordinarily carried by the Director-General (Permanent Secretary) 
of each line function ministry or agency. 
 
The IFAI has a mandate emanating from the access to information law, whereas 
the Jamaica unit was created spontaneously as a means for addressing all 
implementation issues.  As the IFAI is authorized by statute it is a “legal” body, 
and has enjoyed a budget sufficient to meet its objectives and tasks. This has not 
been the case for Jamaica, where the ATI Unit has been dependent on using 
existing monies from the Information Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister.   
 
Experience has demonstrated that specialized coordination units are necessary 
beyond the implementation phase, particularly when tasked with education, 
training, and monitoring.  In Trinidad and Tobago, the Freedom of Information Act 
went into force on February 20, 2001.  Shortly thereafter, a Freedom of 
Information Unit (FOI) was established to provide technical and legal guidance to 
government bodies, raise citizen awareness of the new law, and monitor and 
report on implementation efforts.  The Cabinet initially authorized the FOI Unit for 
one year and then extended it until September 30, 2003, when it was disbanded.  
Even before the ultimate termination of the unit, the size of the staff was being 
reduced.  Although there have been no quantitative studies performed to 
determine the effect of the unit’s discontinuance, some statistics serve to indicate 
its importance and continued need.  In the period of August – November 2001, 
when the FOI Unit was active in training of civil servants and education of 
citizen’s, there were 37 requests for information and 88 quarterly reports received 
from government, representing 55% of all agencies mandated to submit reports.  
For the same period in 2002, when the unit was still engaged, there were 63 
requests for information and 32 reports received, representing 20% of all 
agencies.  By November 2003, when the contract of the last member of the unit 
expired, there had been only 6 information requests and a mere 8% of all 
agencies were still complying with the reporting requirements.      
 
v. Civil Servants Sanctions and Incentives 
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Political will within a democratic framework, and managerial effectiveness within 
a bureaucracy, both require clear incentives for action and unambiguous 
disincentives for inaction.  In all access to information laws in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, as well as in South Africa, sanctions exist for any public servant 
that destroys, alters or damages documents or provides exempt documents 
contrary to the provisions of the law.  What is less common are explicit 
disincentives (sanctions) for persons that fail to meet implementation deadlines, 
delay provision of documents to requestors, or create unwarranted difficulties for 
users.  The draft Bolivian law has added sanctions for these “process” and 
implementation related failures, as well as for documented related illegal actions.  
The Canadian government, as it considers amendments to its twenty-year law, 
has recommended adding penalties for failure to respect deadlines.  In Great 
Britain, senior managers were named to lead the implementation effort and 
oversee the efforts of the FOI officers.  Months before the law was to go into full 
effect, the British parliament heard that “many FOI officers were having difficulty 
getting senior managers to take the requirements of FOI implementation 
seriously . . . One explanation has been that the penalties for non-compliance are 
not clear.”xli   
 
But rewards for good behavior are just as important.  In Canada, the Treasury 
Board, which is responsible for ensuring continued implementation of the Federal 
access to information law, has begun a system of public awards and certificates 
for exemplary civil servants.  Additional incentives would include pay raises 
based on performance evaluations that contain specific implementation criteria, 
promotions, and bonuses.  
 
vi. Phased-in effectiveness of law 
 
The establishment of processes and the necessary mindshift from the culture of 
secrecy to openness takes an enormous amount of time and energy. The 
pressure on governments to quickly put access to information laws into effect is 
unfortunate.  In Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa, the governments gave 
themselves one year or less to implement the law.  In each of these cases, they 
soon discovered the many obstacles.  Although most of these countries pushed 
through the implementation in the prescribed time, many of the necessary 
procedural details had not been resolved.  In Jamaica, the government was 
forced to postpone the date the law would come into effect three times and 
amended the enabling legislation to allow for phased commencement.   
 
Given that a stumbling start may undermine a law’s legitimacy, longer lead times 
for implementation are preferable.  The time period must be long enough to build 
public sector capacity and inform citizens of their right, but not so long as to lose 
momentum or appear to be faltering in the commitment to transparency, as 
occurred during the UK’s five-year implementation period.  During the 
implementation phase, government will generally focus on establishing 
procedures, passing regulations, and preparing or updating record management.   
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But government leaders and civil society groups need to ensure that a longer 
lead time is not used for mass record destruction. In Japan, a “surge in the 
destruction of documents eligible for disclosure under the Freedom of Information 
Law by 10 central government offices” was reported in the lead up to the law 
coming into effect.  The report claims that, for example, “the agriculture ministry 
scrapped 233 tons of documents in fiscal 2000, a 20-fold increase on the 11 tons 
destroyed in fiscal 1999.”xlii  
 
A potentially successful model for implementation is the use of a phased-in 
system whereby the law becomes effective first in a few key ministries and 
agencies and is then phased in over a specified period of time until all of 
government is on-line.  A phase-in approach creates models that more easily can 
be amended or altered to address emerging problems, before they are 
overwhelming the entire information system. As Maurice Frankel of the 
Campaign for the Freedom of Information in Great Britain told a Constitutional 
Affairs Committee reporting on Britain’s progress toward implementation, “I think 
[the big bang approach] is bad verging on potentially catastrophic . . . central 
government could have done this much earlier, had a lot of experience . . . and 
could have dealt with a lot of the problems which are going to come up relatively 
easily.  Instead of that, every single authority in every sector is confronting the 
same problem simultaneously with no opportunity to learn from anybody.”xliii 
 
During the initial phase, responsible civil servants should meet regularly to 
discuss systems capability and lessons learned, and ensure that these are widely 
shared and applied by the next set of agencies, to which the law goes into effect.  
The government should capitalize on this time to complete and approve any 
necessary regulations and internal policies. And interested NGO’s and citizens 
should become more become familiar with the law’s value and defects, make 
requests, learn how to effectively monitor government implementation efforts, 
and use this opportunity to engage positively with the first-round implementers.   
 
A potential disadvantage to the phased-in approach is that governments may 
choose to put non-essential ministries or unimportant agencies in the first round 
of implementation, thus sending a signal that they are not serious about 
transparency.  Alternatively, they may find that citizens are making more 
requests than expected or soliciting the most sensitive and embarrassing 
information.  This reality check could cause government to delay further 
implementation.  Therefore, if adopting a phased-in approach of effectiveness, 
we encourage timelines for each phase to be established as part of the enacting 
legislation or regulations.      
 
 
C. Sustaining the Demand Side 
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Although the focus of this paper is the “supply side”, without an equivalent 
demand for information, government will inevitably stop placing human and 
financial resources in the implementation and administration of an access to 
information regime.  Thus, the response from civil society needs to be energetic, 
committed, and long-term.  Through recent experience, we have seen that strong 
campaigns have formed around the issue of passage of the law, only to 
disintegrate during the implementation and usage phase. Without a demand for 
information, and vigorous monitoring of government implementation and 




These challenges that face countries wanting to implement access to information 
policies, include a lack of education and awareness; a lack of capacity; a lack of 
political will; and a culture of bureaucratic secrecy.  As this list demonstrates and 
this paper asserts, although there are technical aspects to good implementation, 
it is not simply a question of getting the mechanics right. Adjusting the mindset – 
changing, as they say in Spanish, the mentalidad (the mentality) – is a far more 
important, and challenging priority for policy-makers and activists alike. The 
obstacles are immense and the pitfalls many, but the rewards equally 
monumental. But as our own understanding of the theory and practice of good 
implementation grows, so the capacity to diagnose implementation problems 
increases immeasurably. Properly implemented, an access to information law 
can change the rules of the game not just for civil society but also for 
government, and serve to enhance democratic politics.  
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